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THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW: A CLINICAL VIEW OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY. By Walter Bromberg. Westport, Conn.:
Quorum Books. 1979. Pp. x, 442. $25.
In The Uses of Psychiatry in the Law, Walter Bromberg surveys
with apparent approval the current relationship between law and
psychiatry, disciplines which share the "common aim of attempting
to manage human misbehavior" (p. 3). The book uncritically describes relevant case law and psychological data as well as Bromberg's own forty years of clinical experience. Bromberg's perspective
is colored by his confidence in the validity of psychiatric categorization of behavior. He assumes that psychiatrists are in the legal process to stay, and his discussion of the many important issues
concerning use of psychiatric information in the judicial system consistently, albeit implicitly, favors a broad psychiatric role.
The book is organized around the various areas of law to which
psychiatry is regularly applied, including defenses of insanity and
diminished capacity, issues of mental competency, violent and sexual crimes, and child custody. Within each area, Bromberg discusses
legal and psychiatric developments and how they have interacted to
expand or limit the psychiatrist's role. He provides clear explanations of the concepts involved, a surprisingly thorough review of the
case law, and a careful analysis of the difficulties involved in translating psychiatric concepts into legal principles.
Bromberg's exploration of the limitations of psychiatric thinking,
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however, inadequately responds to the most fundamental concerns
of those who caution against extensive application of psychiatry to
legal problems. 1 Doubts about the validity of psychiatric findings
probably explain much of the judicial reluctance to accept psychiatric evidence and categorizations. As Chief Justice Burger suggested
in an article prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court: "[at]
best psychiatry is now an infant among the family of sciences. . . .
[Psychiatrists] may be claiming too much in relation to what they
really understand about the human personality and human behavior."2 Similar doubts have been expressed by other writers. 3
While Bromberg recognizes these doubts in situations where psychiatrists attempt to predict dangerousness, he seems to assume that
similar problems do not plague attempts to characterize past mental
states, decisions regarding what environment is in "the best interest"
of the child, and other difficult areas. Such an assumption seems
unfounded: the impediments to successful prediction of dangerousness may also limit the accuracy of psychiatric evidence in other areas. Ennis's ·and Litwack's comprehensive study of psychiatric
evaluations indicated that "[h]uman behavior is difficult to understand, and, at present, impossible to predict."4 They found that psychiatric judgments can be colored by, among other things,
socioeconomic factors, personal biases, and institutional contexts
(i.e., the training of the psychiatrist and the context of the evaluation). The effect of these biases may be particularly important because of the ambiguity of psychiatric data. 5 Bromberg does not
explain why these barriers to accurate psychiatric evidence are confined to predictions of dangerousness. On the contrary, his response
to these concerns is at times flippant; he refers to one writer's statement that the transcript in the Jack Ruby trial "screams out . . . the
clarion message that psychiatric testimony should never be permitted
in the courtroom" as "shrill" (p. 123), and he characterizes a judge's
suggestion that "psychiatry [is] an empirical and speculative science
with rather elastic notation and terminology which is usually wise
after the event" as "testy" (p. 350).
1. See generally T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977); T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS (2d ed. 1974); T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); T. SZASZ,
PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
2. Burger,

Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts,

FED. PROBATION, June 1964,

at 7.

3. See, e.g., Kaplan, An Academic Lawyer Plays Armchair Analyst: Some Speculations 011
the Relevance of Psychoanalysis lo the Law, 46 NEB. L. REV. 759, 797 (1967).
4. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumptio11 of Expertise: Flippi11g Coi11s i11 1/1e
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 752 (1974).
5. Id. at 728-29.
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Bromberg hints that these concerns are unwarranted because the
adversary system adequately screens psychiatric evidence. He rejects
the much-debated proposal that psychiatric testimony should be provided by impartial court-appointed examiners. Although psychiatrists are frequently uncomfortable with the adversary process
because opposing counsel attack their credibility and because legal
rules limit their ability to qualify testimony, Bromberg believes the
inherent subjectivity of much psychiatric testimony necessitates
cross-examination and rebuttal. This reliance on the adversary system is disquieting, for it suggests that Bromberg's enthusiasm for extensive use of psychiatry in legal proceedings is based as much on an
unenunciated belief in the genius of the legal system as on his faith
in psychiatry. Confidence in the legal system may well be warranted, but one would hope that a psychiatrist so smug about his
profession's role in court would rely more heavily on the strengths of
his own discipline.

